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Sustainability and Depoliticisation: 
Certifications in the Cut-Flower Industry
at Lake Naivasha, Kenya 
Gerda Kuiper and Andreas Gemählich 
Abstract: This article focuses on the emergence of certification schemes in 
the cut-flower industry in Naivasha, Kenya. It is shown that, although this 
turn is often legitimised through references to “sustainability,” the change 
was mainly brought about by the growing importance of a new value chain 
of “direct sales.” The article furthermore elaborates on the most well-
known certificate in Naivasha, Fairtrade. This certificate aims to enhance 
sustainability by empowering workers, yet it does not profoundly change 
power relations within the industry. The article concludes that “sustain-
ability” in the context of Naivasha has been an ill-defined concept, used to 
legitimise a turn to certifications. Rather than bringing about a profound 
transformation of the production process, these certifications obscure and 
even consolidate the existing socio-economic configuration of the industry. 
Certifications thus run the risk of having “depoliticising” effects. 
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Lake Naivasha is known as the biggest cut-flower–producing region glo-
bally, consisting of approximately 55 farms covering over 2,000 hectares 
with greenhouses, employing an estimated 40,000 people, and producing 
roughly 8,000 metric tonnes of flowers, mainly roses, per month.1 The 
floriculture industry in Kenya is driven by foreign capital: the first 
Naivasha flower farm was established by DCK, a Danish company, in 
the early 1970s.2 Interviews with farm management indicate that even 
today, both the shareholders and top managers of the majority of the 
farms are predominantly European or Indian, not Kenyan. Since the 
early 2000s, there have been concerns that this “global” cut-flower pro-
duction might cause the “local” social-ecological system around Lake 
Naivasha to collapse. Media reports began to appear with alarming head-
lines such as “The tragedy that is Lake Naivasha”3 and “Lake Naivasha is 
dying.”4 The biographer of environmentalist Joan Root also depicted 
such an apocalyptic scenario, as illustrated by the following description: 
A bizarre, only-in-Africa scenario that had turned her [Joan Root’s] 
beloved lake into a war zone, in a conflict created by, of all things, 
roses […] resulting in slums, squalor, crime, and some insisted, 
ecological apocalypse. […]. The lake, from which the flower farms 
sucked up water and into which they spat back pesticides, was so 
contaminated that its demise was predicted within five years if im-
mediate measures were not taken. (Seal 2010: xiv) 
Non-governmental organisations’ (NGO) reports critical of labour condi-
tions (e.g. KHRC 2012) and scientific work on the lake’s ecological state 
(e.g. Mavuti and Harper 2006) reinforced this image of the Naivasha 
flower industry as a profoundly unsustainable business, both socially and 
economically. However, the predicted collapse of the flower industry 
and/or of the Naivasha social-ecological system has not yet taken place. 
On the contrary, production numbers for cut-flowers have quadrupled 
compared to production volumes in 1995 and have almost doubled in the 
last 10 years (KFC 2015). 
The discrepancy between the apocalyptic scenarios and the continu-
ous growth of the flower industry has raised the question of how “sus-
tainable” the industry really is, which has been evaluated by several re-
1  These estimates are based on interviews with stakeholders in Naivasha that 
took place between May and August 2015 and on statistics provided by the 
Kenya Flower Council (KFC 2015). 
2  See Daily Nation, Why not try flower power?, 8 March 1978, 18. 
3  Daily Nation, The tragedy that is Lake Naivasha, 5 October 2009, 15. 
4  The East African, Lake Naivasha is dying, 20–26 July 2009, 8. 
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searchers and other interested parties (e.g. Tallontire et al. 2005; Food & 
Water Watch 2008; Riisgaard 2007, 2009, 2011; Mekonnen et al. 2012). 
However, despite featuring as a central concept in negotiations on the 
responsibility for the environmental and social consequences of the 
large-scale cut-flower production, the concept of sustainability is not well 
defined. This article therefore does not aim to evaluate the “sustainabil-
ity” of the industry; instead, it explains how and why this concept has 
become influential within the global flower industry. Moreover, by de-
scribing the positions of both the Naivasha farms within the value chain 
and the workers within the farms, the article shows how a drive for “sus-
tainability” has obscured power relations, analysing the ways in which 
the vague notion of “sustainability” has been used to legitimise existing 
practices rather than to bring about change. 
These legitimisations play a role in various contexts – for instance, 
in lobbying and policymaking. However, the best example of the work-
ings of “sustainability” are certification schemes. These are a set of for-
mal institutions that take the form of standards 
that transmit information to customers and end-users about a 
product’s technical specifications, its compliance with health and 
safety criteria or the processes by which it has been produced and 
sourced. (Nadvi 2008: 325) 
Previous studies on the Kenyan flower industry have analysed interlink-
ages between standards and labour rights. These studies conclude that 
although labour conditions have improved, standards are ultimately a 
tool of governance within the cut-flower value chain and therefore do 
not challenge the underlying power relations (Hale and Opondo 2005; 
Nelson et al. 2007; Riisgaard 2007; Gibbon and Riisgaard 2014). Con-
tributing to this debate, we argue that by using the vague concept of 
“sustainability,” standards not only effectively obscure unequal power 
relations within the industry but actually reinforce them. We thus analyse 
standards as tools of control over farms and labour. 
This article is one outcome of an interdisciplinary collaboration be-
tween a human geographer and a cultural anthropologist. We conducted 
joint research in 2014 and 2015, mainly in Naivasha but also at other 
hubs of the flower industry, such as the Dutch flower auction. This art-
icle is primarily based on data gathered through semi-structured inter-
views5 and through visits to 18 certified and non-certified Kenyan flower 
5  This included 35 interviews with farm managers, 36 interviews with farm work-
ers, 24 interviews with stakeholders in Naivasha such as the union, government 
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farms. It is furthermore based on research of the Nation Media Group 
archive in Nairobi and on longitudinal observations during 19 repeated 
visits to a Naivasha flower farm that was in the process of becoming 
Fairtrade-certified. 
The following section introduces the concepts of governance in the 
value chain, the governmentality of standards, and depoliticisation. In the 
sections after that, these concepts are used to explain the increasing 
number of certifications for cut-flowers and to analyse the effects of 
such certifications on the position of farms within the value chain. This 
empirical part ends with a description of the example of Fairtrade and its 
effects within individual farms. The article concludes with a discussion of 
the depoliticising effects of the omnipresent but ill-defined concept of 
“sustainability” in the context of the Naivasha cut-flower industry. This 
analysis indicates how “sustainability” is used as a legitimising tool in 
negotiations over responsibility across different scales.6 
Governance, Governmentality, and
Depoliticisation
The conceptualisation of governance in the global commodity chain 
(GCC) and global value chain (GVC) literature offers a framework to 
analyse changes in globally linked industries, in this case the increasing 
importance of “sustainability” within the global cut-flower industry. In 
these frameworks, governance is referred to as “non-market coordin-
ation of economic activity” (Gereffi et al. 2001: 4). Hence, it is used to 
analyse power relations within a value chain on an inter-firm level, in-
cluding rules, institutions, and norms, and it deals with access to value 
chains and markets and the distribution of profits and costs (Fitter and 
Kaplinsky 2001: 77; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001: 20–21; Bair 2005: 159, 
2009: 26). The original GCC framework distinguished dichotomically 
between producer- and buyer-driven chains (Gereffi 1994); in the more 
recently evolved GVC approach, this framework was expanded to five 
types of governance (Gereffi et al. 2005; Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 5–6). 
                                                                                                    
agencies, and NGOs, and 24 interviews with other industry players such as 
lobby groups, traders, and representatives of certification schemes. 
6  The authors thank Dr. Tijo Salverda, other participants in the workshop “Trans-
forming Africa – Africa Transforming?” (Stellenbosch, 25–27 November 2017, 
organised by the University of Cologne), and two anonymous reviewers for their 
constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. 
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Certifications and their standards have become a central object of 
study. From a GVC perspective, standards are an instrument to reduce 
complexity. Their enforcement is a part of governance strategies and at 
the same time an expression of these. Moreover, standards are an entry 
barrier to economic networks and chains (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001: 77; 
Kaplinsky and Morris 2001: 30; Gereffi et al. 2005: 82, 91; Nadvi 2008: 
325–326; Bair 2009: 32; Sturgeon 2009: 117, 129). The GVC concept and 
its governance terminology have been used to analyse power dynamics in 
the cut-flower industry, including the role of standards (cf. Hughes 2000; 
Hale and Opondo 2005; Riisgaard 2009). Contributing to these debates, 
this article shows how standards in the cut-flower industry emerged as a 
result of dynamics in the value chain. It discusses the role of a drive for 
“sustainability” in new modes of governance within the industry. These 
new modes of governance took the shape of certifications, which use the 
vague notion of “sustainability” as their raison d’être. 
Apart from describing how certifications emerged within the case at 
hand, this article also addresses how these certifications materialise in the 
production areas. Previous studies mostly focused on the Kenyan cut-
flower industry on a national level and rarely focused on the local or farm 
level (cf. Hughes 2000, 2001; Gibbon and Riisgaard 2014). Therefore, 
with regard to the biggest production hub, at Lake Naivasha, this article 
elucidates what happens when certification schemes are put in place. 
Although the upcoming certifications try to “coordinate economic 
activities,” they do not originate from the market itself (cf. Gereffi et al. 
2001: 4). Yet, they attempt to make trade more “sustainable” through 
mechanisms that are based in the market rather than, for example, in gov-
ernment regulations. Instead of accepting involvement by the govern-
ment, certifications try to govern themselves by regulating prices or intro-
ducing standards. The certifications thus have a certain “governmental-
ity.” Several scholars have directed anthropological criticism of develop-
ment aid, formulated in the late twentieth century, towards certifications: 
Development from this perspective is seen as an imposition of 
Western assumptions that privilege scientific rationality over local 
knowledge and cultural traditions, not to mention over the desires of 
development “recipients” themselves. (Moberg and Lyon 2010: 13) 
In her article on Fairtrade certification in Naivasha, Dolan (2007) pointed 
out that, even though Fairtrade proclaims to strengthen farms’ and work-
ers’ positions, it is based on technologies for governing them: 
This governmentality is visible in the technologies (e.g., standards, 
audits, and certification) that fairtrade organizations employ to 
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shape a certain type of African subject, one fully safeguarded by 
modern rights and protections. (Dolan 2007: 251)  
These technologies leave little space for other – for instance, workers’ – 
values. One could thus question whether these certifications actually lead 
to emancipation, as it seems they might instead perpetuate existing hier-
archies (Dolan 2010). However, Moberg and Lyon (2010) remind us that 
we should not assume that the techniques employed by certifications are 
always fully successful. Instead of taking the discourse at face value, we 
should investigate what these certifications do in practice: (how) did the 
adoption of certifications change socio-economic structures and power 
relations within the Naivasha flower farms? 
In an attempt to answer this question, we apply the concept of “de-
politicisation” as discussed by Swyngedouw (2014: 123), who drew at-
tention to the rise of “a consensual mode of governance that has re-
duced political conflict and disagreement.” We argue that the shift to 
certifications and the introduction of new forms of “governmentality” in 
the Kenyan cut-flower industry led to a “depoliticisation” of labour rela-
tions and production processes. The following section starts this discus-
sion by describing the shift to certifications. 
Certified “Sustainability”: From Origins
to Implementation 
In the subsequent discussion of our empirical material, we show how the 
concept of sustainability and the rise of certifications changed the process 
of negotiating responsibility between producers, buyers, and consumers in 
the cut-flower industry. This process was set in motion by changes in the 
flower value chain. 
The Emergence of a New Cut-Flower Value Chain 
Certifications in the cut-flower industry first emerged in the early 1990s. 
One of the first schemes, MPS (More Profitable Sustainability), was ini-
tiated by the Dutch flower industry in 1993. Its aim was twofold: to de-
velop strategies to reduce environmental impact, and to make these efforts 
visible in order to promote a positive image of the industry (MPS 2015). 
Started as an industry initiative, standards rapidly gained importance 
in the late 1990s with the market entry of European supermarkets and 
the emergence of a new cut-flower value chain (Riisgaard 2009: 326). 
Traditionally, cut-flowers from Kenya were linked to the (European) 
 The Cut-Flower Industry at Lake Naivasha, Kenya 37 
consumer markets via the Dutch flower auctions. In this value chain, 
Kenyan farms export their goods to the Netherlands, where they are put 
“on the clock”7 by their sales agents and bought mainly by wholesalers. 
The market entry of European non-floristic shops, mainly supermarkets, 
led to the emergence of “direct sales.” In this value chain, Kenyan farms 
sell flowers via sales agents to importers in the Netherlands that have 
year-round fixed amounts of supply for big retail chains.8 Although the 
direct sales’ shares and importance in the production and sales strategy 
of flower farms are increasing, both value chains coexist even in the sales 
strategies of most farms, and display multiple interlinkages (see also 
Hughes 2000: 182). 
The emergence of direct sales as a second “strand” (Riisgaard 2009: 
328) in the cut-flower value chain provoked fundamental changes in the 
cut-flower industry. Previous studies have argued that it led to a shift 
from a rather market-based governance, as formulated in the GVC litera-
ture (Gereffi et al. 2005: 86), to a classical buyer-driven chain (Hughes 
2000; Hale and Opondo 2005; Riisgaard 2009): in the auction system, 
producers and buyers are not directly connected, as no one knows who 
will buy how many flowers at what price; hence, the relations between 
actors are rather loose. However, direct sales – as the name implies – 
establish direct connections between the producing flower farms on the 
one side and the buying retail chains on the other. Retailers prefer long-
term relationships with farms and buy large quantities. 
But how are these big buyers able to exert control within the value 
chain? Next to pricing pressure, volatile demands, and product specifica-
tions (Hale and Opondo 2005: 317–318; Riisgaard 2009: 328), our data 
shows that certifications are not only an expression of these control 
mechanisms, but also a tool to establish them. The introduction of stand-
ards engendered new types of business relations within the industry. 
Although long-term relations between growers, wholesalers, and retail 
chains remain mainly based on handshakes or oral agreements, formal 
sanctions have been introduced into the cut-flower value chain in the 
form of certification schemes. These schemes hardly play a role in the 
traditional, auction-based value chain, since only the MPS certification is 
displayed in the Dutch auction system. However, in the direct sales value 
chain, traceability, sustainability, and fair production processes are no 
7  The flower auction works by using a clock showing prices and running down 
until a buyer is willing to accept the offered price. 
8  Unless otherwise stated, the following data refers to observations on farms and 
interviews conducted with farm managers in Naivasha in 2014 and 2015 and 
with traders in Aalsmeer in September 2015. 
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longer left to informal institutions such as reputation or trust but have 
been translated into formal rules. Non-compliance with these formal 
rules is sanctioned, for instance, by a revocation of the certificate, which 
implies the exclusion of certain markets.9 These rules are not formalised 
in national laws or regulations but in numerous, market-based certifica-
tion schemes. The two main features of these certification schemes are 
its assertions that it is creating a sustainable business, and the visible logo 
that transmits this assertion to consumers. The rising demand for sus-
tainable, transparent products has become a major driving force behind 
consumer markets (Dolan 2007). Big buyers profit from this develop-
ment in two ways: first, by offering the demanded products and, second, 
by translating this demand into an instrument of control over their pro-
ducers without being part of the sanctioning process, which is left to the 
certification bodies. 
Consequences for the Kenyan Flower Industry 
The effect of certifications for the global and especially the Kenyan cut-
flower industry have been discussed widely in NGO-commissioned re-
ports (e.g. Klier 2012; Leipold and Morgante 2013; Wilshaw 2013; Happ 
2016), but also in geographical studies (Hale and Opondo 2005; Riis-
gaard 2009; Raynolds 2012; Riisgaard and Gibbon 2014). The early ex-
pansion of the cut-flower industry and its economic success with profit 
rates up to 50 per cent10 are often at least partly explained by the lack of 
national and local regulations. Nevertheless, especially in Naivasha, en-
vironmental concerns have been addressed quite strongly over the past 
20 years by the industry – for instance, a lake-management plan and 
water-abstraction limitations were initiated and funded by the floriculture 
industry. Combined with strong lobbies on both the regional and na-
tional level – orchestrated by the Lake Naivasha Growers Group and the 
Kenya Flower Council – that are actively marketing these efforts, flower-
farm managers feel legitimised to state that their industry is sustainable. 
These statements are backed by local environmentalists, state agencies, 
and even researchers; for instance, flower farms were called the “model 
users” of the local water users’ association. The biggest risk for the sus-
tainability of the industry is often seen as being linked to its economic 
success – determined by market dynamics. 
9  Interviews with the Global Flowers Product Manager of Fairtrade Africa, 26 June 
2015, Nairobi. 
10  Unless otherwise stated, the following data refers to interviews conducted with 
farm managers and stakeholders in Naivasha in 2014 and 2015. 
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Flower growers claim to be engaged in enhancing sustainability be-
cause they have realised that saving their environment and supporting 
their employees pays off. One example of their engagement is in terms 
of water pollution: state agencies monitored an enhancement of sewage 
treatment plants, improving the quality of fresh water that is eventually 
reused by flower farms. The better the quality of the water, the lower the 
costs for the treatment it undergoes to make it usable for irrigation. 
Considering this general shift towards a sustainable production of 
flowers, certificates can be seen as a barrier to market access rather than 
an indicator of sustainable production (Gibbon and Riisgaard 2014: 124). 
Flower growers need multiple certifications in order to get access to the 
value chain of direct sales; therefore, they tend to have as many as pos-
sible. Single certifications do not impact the farms substantially: require-
ments are often similar, so the efforts towards compliance are taken for 
financial rather than structural reasons (cf. Raynolds 2012). A recently 
Fairtrade-certified farm spent between EUR 3,000 and 4,000 to acquire 
the certification; these costs were mainly concentrated in the audit and in 
setting up the administrative structures, whereas the changes in the pro-
duction process were negligible. Thus, the risk for growers when apply-
ing for additional certifications is quite low; combined with the buyers’ 
demand for compliance, there is an incentive to become certified. 
In conclusion, the main reason for growers to apply for certifica-
tions is not the indication of a sustainable production process but the 
wish to access the new buyer-driven value chain. Hence, by introducing 
certifications, sustainability (however ill defined) becomes “standard-
ised,” and non-compliance with this standardised sustainability becomes 
sanctionable. In addition, this standardised sustainability also becomes 
valorised, but only for buyers, as they can translate it into higher prices 
or at least a higher demand from consumers. To summarise, certifica-
tions seem to add little to sustainable production. Instead, they are a 
product of new governance structures and a stabilisation mechanism for 
these structures. 
Fairtrade and Workers’ “Empowerment” 
The previous section has shown that the turn towards certifications in 
the Naivasha flower industry was driven by the governance structure in 
the value chain, not by a profound wish to make current production 
practices more sustainable. Nevertheless, these certifications and their 
standards have real effects on the production sites. This section probes 
into these effects. It takes the most well-known certification, Fairtrade, 
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as a case: what does Fairtrade do within the farms and in workers’ com-
munities in Naivasha?11 
Fairtrade provides an interesting case study because it has quickly 
gained in prominence in recent years. The first Fairtrade-certified flower 
farm in Naivasha received its label in 2003. Only 12 years later, in 2015, 15 
farms (around one-third of the farms in Naivasha) were certified. More-
over, this specific certification, which targets consumers and not busi-
nesses such as florists, is prominent in the consumer markets in Europe. 
Fairtrade is an atypical certification: unlike other schemes, it did not 
originate from the flower industry itself but stemmed from a broader 
political movement. It also works with products other than flowers. The 
original aim of the movement was to profoundly transform international 
trade and to decrease inequalities in trade relations. Fairtrade initially 
only worked with small-scale producers but in more recent years also 
included products produced by hired labour, such as flowers, and enter-
ed into mainstream value chains (Smith and Barrientos 2005). As stated 
by a representative of TransFair12 in Germany: Fairtrade is the only certi-
fication scheme that aims to change an existing market. 
The Fairtrade organisations explicitly aim to change power relations. 
One of the three pillars of the Fairtrade “theory of change” is the em-
powerment of workers (Fairtrade International n.d.: 8). Fairtrade Africa 
claims to enhance “sustainability” by strengthening the position of (both 
small-scale and large-scale) farmers and of hired labour: “By offering an 
alternative approach to trade, Fairtrade supports producers in securing 
better deals, contributing to greater sustainable development in Africa” 
(Fairtrade Africa 2015b). Fairtrade thus hopes to achieve a shift in power 
relations. However, it does so by securing a “fairer” price and a stable mar-
ket. It is, therefore, despite its origins as a movement for alternative trade, 
firmly situated within a market logic. Along these lines, Luetchford (2011) 
argues that Fairtrade, rather than providing an alternative to regular trade, 
11  Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on observations and interviews at 
a newly certified farm in Naivasha in 2014 and 2015 and on interviews with the 
Global Flowers Product Manager of Fairtrade Africa (Nairobi, 26 June 2015) 
and officers of TransFair (Cologne, 22 February 2017). 
12  The Fairtrade representatives mentioned in the previous footnote explained 
that Fairtrade consists of several organisations: Fairtrade International, which 
sets the standards and provides an overall strategy; producer networks that are 
regionally organised, such as Fairtrade Africa; and national organisations in the 
markets such as TransFair in Germany. 
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offers something “extra.”13 In that sense, it has become comparable to 
other certification schemes that originated directly within the industry. 
Nevertheless, although working within an existing industry, Fair-
trade explicitly aims to reconfigure power relations, which is a final rea-
son to take Fairtrade as a case here. In what follows, we discuss Fairtrade 
measures and their effects on power relations in the Naivasha flower 
industry. We do not aim to assess the impact on specific labour condi-
tions, as have Klier (2012) and Happ (2016). Nelson, Martin, and Ewert 
(2007: 71), who likewise assessed the impact of codes of conduct, con-
cluded that even though certain conditions improved, inequalities within 
the GVC remained. They raised the question of whether codes of con-
duct could move beyond addressing workers’ practical interests and 
include strategic interests. Based on an analysis of the effects of Fairtrade 
measures on power relations within Naivasha flower farms, we argue 
that addressing strategic interests is perhaps not even a goal of certifica-
tion schemes, despite Fairtrade’s explicit proclamations to the contrary. 
Instead, the measures taken effectively “depoliticise” labour relations and 
production processes. 
Fairtrade Standards 
Fairtrade aims to strengthen the position of farms and workers through 
several measures. First of all, the Fairtrade “Standard for Hired Labour” 
and “Standard for Flowers and Plants for Hired Labour” contain social 
and environmental requirements, such as freedom of association and the 
banning of the use of certain chemicals. “These standards improve the 
sustainability of the farms and improve the quality of the working envir-
onment” (Fairtrade Africa 2015a: 4). There are specific standards for 
specific products, but geographically speaking they are applied univer-
sally. That is, the standard for flowers should be applied the same way in, 
for example, Colombia as in Kenya. These standards are designed and 
updated through a complex process involving many stakeholders, in-
cluding the producers (Fairtrade Deutschland 2016). However, “produc-
ers” in the context of hired labour are the farms as such, usually repre-
13  In this article we take Fairtrade as the most prominent example of around a 
dozen certifications, to show their (depoliticising) effects in the flower industry in 
Naivasha. We do not aim to evaluate the broader fair trade movement. Never-
theless, it is worthwhile to mention the large body of literature on the origins of 
Fairtrade, and on the directions it has taken recently, e.g. in regard to the inclusion 
of hired labour. For an overview, see Dolan (2010) and Moberg and Lyon (2010).  
 42 Gerda Kuiper and Andreas Gemählich 
sented by local managers. Thus, workers are not directly involved in the 
setting of standards. 
The Fairtrade standards – the “technologies” for governance (Dolan 
2007: 251) – at first sight seem stringent: each page is full of obligations 
marked in bold font. However, whether the standards are always fully 
enforced is questionable. Farms are regularly audited, but interviewed 
workers and managers expressed criticism of auditors who look only at 
what is administered and not at actual practices (cf. Dolan’s [2010: 286] 
analysis of audits as “governing technologies”). Furthermore, it is also 
questionable whether all these obligations, even if enforced, would pro-
foundly alter relations between employers and employees. A telling ex-
ample are the papers put up in greenhouses and packhouses by the man-
agement that detail protocols on what to do in case of emergency such as 
a fire. No one seemed to read them; for one thing, they were mostly 
written in English, whereas the working language is Swahili. A greenhouse 
supervisor explained that these papers are merely there “so that if auditors 
come, they see that the workers are being cared about.” 
Despite these difficulties, some measures included in these stand-
ards are implemented and effectively ameliorate the farm workers’ labour 
conditions. Examples are the provision of protective clothing and an 
increasing prevalence of permanent rather than short-term contracts (cf. 
Happ 2016). However, these are broader trends in the Naivasha industry, 
set in motion by market demands. For instance, Riisgaard and Gibbon 
(2014: 274) pointed out that a shift in the types of flowers produced and 
an increased demand for quality flowers induced a need for a stable 
workforce and thus enhanced the increase of permanent contracts. 
Moreover, the standards overlap partly with other types of regulation (cf. 
the comparison between the Fairtrade Standards and the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement in Anker and Anker [2014]). It is thus questionable 
how many of these positive practices can be ascribed to the implementa-
tion of the Fairtrade standard alone. Despite the (at first sight) stringent 
standards, much still depends on the willingness and the ability of those 
in charge, the managers of the farms, to (meaningfully) implement the 
prescribed measures (cf. Klier 2012). 
Fairtrade Premium 
A unique feature of Fairtrade is the premium. Fairtrade buyers pay a 
premium of 10 per cent of the commercial price, meant to be invested in 
“socio-economic and environmental projects” for the workers (Fairtrade 
Africa 2015b). This fund is managed by a Fairtrade Premium Committee 
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(FPC), containing elected workers and advisors from the management 
(Fairtrade International 2014: 9). 
Dolan (2007), who carried out fieldwork in Naivasha 10 years ago, 
analysed the premium as a “governing” tool. Although our findings 
point towards the same conclusion, they nevertheless differ from Do-
lan’s in certain regards. Where she concluded that workers were mys-
tified about Fairtrade and perceived it as another form of charity from 
“the white man” (2007: 253), the employees we spoke to a decade later 
were aware that under Fairtrade, a part of the profit is set aside for them. 
Workers from non-certified farms also knew about Fairtrade and ex-
pressed the hope that their farms would become certified because they 
hoped to profit from the premiums. As one of them explained, 
Fairtrade means that some stems come back to the employee. For 
example, 5 shilling of the 75 shilling for which a stem is being sold 
comes back to the employee.  
As this quote indicates, workers do not perceive of this money as charity 
but as something they earn with their labour. 
Also unlike what Dolan (2007) described, most employees we inter-
viewed were familiar with the basic regulations governing the premium 
money. Elections for the FPC were taken seriously and general assem-
blies were well attended. The workers also knew that the Fairtrade rules 
precluded their ability to spend the premium money at their own will. 
The main restriction is that the premium has to be spent through pro-
jects. Only a small percentage can be given out to workers in cash.14 Al-
though farm workers would prefer cash payments, this way of supple-
menting low wages was nothing new to them: long before Fairtrade was 
introduced, farms in Naivasha paid workers partly “in kind” – for in-
stance, through sponsoring schools for the workers’ children.15 The 
obligation to work with projects has been justified by claims that the 
workers would not know how to manage their money themselves: “They 
would only spend it on alcohol,” said one manager who was responsible 
for the implementation of Fairtrade on the farm where he worked. This 
project-based and somewhat paternalistic approach of Fairtrade thus fits 
into the already-existing socio-economic configuration of the industry. 
However, its highly regulated manner was new, as was the official role 
14  Data on premium use provided by Fairtrade Africa in 2015 shows that only 1% 
of the premium was given out as cash to workers. 
15  For instance, the biggest flower farm, Oserian, had already established a school 
for the children of its workers by 1987 (see Daily Nation, Public tasks facing pri-
vate companies, 5 June 1987, 6). 
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for workers in the decision of which projects to take on (cf. Klier 2012). 
Nevertheless, this new role did not enable workers to put the premium 
to use for achieving their “strategic” rather than “practical” interests (cf. 
Nelson, Martin, and Ewert 2007). 
An instance of a practical interest is education, which is a popular 
goal for premium money, both among farms and workers.16 Projects 
such as bursaries for secondary education of workers’ children take a 
burden off the shoulders of parents. In addition, interviewed workers 
expressed appreciation for the provision of interest-free loans and sub-
sidies that assist in purchasing items such as televisions, gas cookers, or 
even plots of land – goods they could otherwise not afford. 
The obligatory community projects did not even always address 
such “practical” interests. One example is an environmentally friendly 
community cooker that was installed in 201117 but did not seem to be in 
use in 2014. The majority of the farm workers are migrants who consider 
Naivasha to be “just a place of work” and plan to return to their region 
of origin after a number of years (Kunas 2011). They would rather use 
the premium money to invest in their community “back home,” but that 
is not in the interest of Fairtrade and farm management. The farms pre-
fer to improve the dirty, cramped settlements in Naivasha where most of 
the workers live: managers complained that these settlements reflect 
negatively on the industry. The example of community projects shows 
that due to the regulations set by Fairtrade, premium money is some-
times put to use in the interest of the farms rather than in the interest of 
the workers (cf. the findings of Klier [2012]). This raises the question of 
how much say workers have with regard to the spending of the premium 
money and the extent to which they are “empowered.” 
A large part of the premium money18 is spent on running the FPC 
and on what is called “capacity building”: training of committee members 
and workers to create “awareness.” There are “Fairtrade awareness days” 
and promotional materials such as Fairtrade shirts. These campaigns seem 
to be quite successful when we compare the recent rate of engagement 
among workers with Dolan’s (2007) findings 10 years ago. But although 
this “awareness” is meant to “empower” workers and provide them with 
a framework for organising themselves,19 we argue that it above all se-
16  Data from Fairtrade Africa shows that 26% of the premium money was spent 
on educational projects. 
17  See Daily Nation, Smart is when you convert, 1 March 2011. 
18  16% of the premium, according to the Fairtrade Africa data. 
19  In the Fairtrade Standard for Hired Labour: “Training for workers is essential 
in order to achieve empowerment” (Fairtrade International 2014: 15). 
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cures their compliance. Likewise, as indicated by Raynolds (2012), com-
mittees might build trust between workers and managers but they have no 
legal status and are connected to single farms. They therefore help to 
maintain peaceful industrial relations, but we argue that they do not pro-
vide workers with more political leverage. In short, committees and 
“awareness” activities that are funded with premium money are not nec-
essarily empowering but are rather instrumental to establishing the gov-
ernance of Fairtrade that Dolan (2007) pointed towards in her analysis. 
Fairtrade and the Freedom of Association 
An important principle of Fairtrade in the context of hired labour – 
which sets it apart from some other certifications (see Riisgaard 2009) – 
is improving labour conditions through unionisation.20 This aspect is less 
well known to workers, and with reason. Unionisation and the introduc-
tion of collective bargaining agreements (CBA) in the flower industry in 
Naivasha started years before Fairtrade established itself there. The first 
flower farm in Naivasha, DCK, had signed an agreement with the trade 
union KPAWU as early as 1971.21 Also, many of the demands in the 
Fairtrade Standard for Hired Labour overlap with the contemporary 
CBAs – for instance, with regard to working hours, annual leave, and 
provision of a housing allowance (Anker and Anker 2014). Adherence to 
the CBA thus does not make a significant difference in farms that are 
Fairtrade-certified. 
In addition to being superfluous, this emphasis on unionisation over-
looks power inequalities. It assumes that workers’ rights will be properly 
secured once there is an active trade union. Yet, although collective repre-
sentation might enhance the political leverage of workers, employers (or 
even indirect forces from outside, such as preferences of buyers) still have 
the final say in setting labour conditions. In addition, Fairtrade’s approach 
does not recognise that trade unions themselves are not void of politics.22 
In Naivasha, we observed internal conflicts within a union and cases where 
employees did not feel adequately represented by shop stewards.23 
20  “Fairtrade International promotes the rights of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining as the foundation of ensuring workers’ rights, and consid-
ers independent and democratic trade unions the best means for achieving this” 
(Fairtrade International 2014: 3). 
21  Kenya Gazette, Gazette Notice No. 1312, 26 April 1974. 
22  See Riisgaard (2009: 333) on the historical connection between the union 
KPAWU and the former ruling party KANU. 
23  A conspicuous example where politics clearly played a role is the case in which 
a local union leader was dismissed by the union branch office after he testified 
 46 Gerda Kuiper and Andreas Gemählich 
Fairtrade’s Drive for a Living Wage 
The final pillar of Fairtrade in the context of the flower industry is the 
goal of a so-called “living wage.” A report written for Fairtrade (Anker 
and Anker 2014: 2) estimated that a living wage in Naivasha in 2014 
would be over KES 14,000, excluding benefits such as a housing allow-
ance. Yet, basic salaries for general workers of both certified and non-
certified farms that followed the CBA roughly ranged from KES 5,000 to 
10,000. Although salaries increased with length of employment, even 
general workers who had worked on the same farm for 20 years did not 
earn the above-mentioned living wage (ibid: 40). Moreover, the report 
(ibid.: 6) points out that real wages for flower-farm workers have dropped 
significantly over the years, even though nominally they have increased. 
Fairtrade strives for the payment of a living wage. At the same time, 
it has not made increased wages a requirement (Fairtrade International 
2014: 22). It allows the farms to argue that paying a living wage is not 
possible under current economic conditions. Perhaps as a consequence, 
Happ (2016) did not find significant differences between the wages of 
permanent employees in Fairtrade-certified farms and those of permanent 
employees on other Naivasha farms. Fairtrade focuses on enhancing the 
financial situation of workers through other measures, such as premium 
benefits (cf. Klier 2012). In effect, and despite the explicit aim of securing 
a “living wage,” Fairtrade’s policy might reduce pressure on the farms to 
pay significantly higher wages and thus diminish the negotiation space of 
workers, at least when it comes to wages paid in the near future. 
Certifications as Depoliticisation 
The previous sections showed how certifications and their standardised 
“sustainability” gained importance in the cut-flower industry and discussed 
certifications’ limited effects on power relations at the farm level. Certifi-
cations’ assertions that they are creating a sustainable industry carry moral 
and political connotations. However, they are the outcomes of economic 
processes of coordination and power relations as analysed above. We 
therefore argue that the shift to certifications and especially to Fairtrade 
has led to a “depoliticisation” as defined by Swyngedouw (2014). 
In the case of the cut-flower industry, certifications do not “funda-
mentally question the existing state of the neo-liberal political economic 
                                                                                                    
at the International Criminal Court in The Hague (Peter Otieno Ombude v. 
Kenya Plantation & Agricultural Workers [2015] eKLR). 
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configuration” (Swyngedouw 2014: 123); instead, they have become (or 
perhaps have always been) a substantial part of this configuration. For 
instance, Fairtrade offers technical solutions, such as the premium, that 
fit into the existing globalised capitalist system with its market-based, 
monetary solutions. Thus, certifications obscure the workings of the 
market instead of questioning them (cf. Luetchford 2011). 
This acceptance of the status quo is not the only depoliticising ef-
fect of the introduction of certifications in the cut-flower industry. It is 
also a good example of what Swyngedouw describes as “the post-demo-
cratic inclusion of different opinions […] in stakeholder arrangements of 
impotent participation and ‘good’ governance” (2014: 123). 
There is a gap between those who are capable of translating the 
vague notion of “sustainability” into concrete measures and those who 
are responsible for the implementation of these measures. The interpret-
ation of sustainability is mainly left to the creators of the standards of 
certification system – mostly actors from the industry or activists. It is 
therefore not part of a public and democratic legislative process, a situa-
tion exacerbated by the Kenyan state having interfered little in the cut-
flower industry. But while industry actors and activists set the definition 
of sustainability, responsibility for the implementation of a “sustainable 
production” is mainly put on the shoulders of consumers and workers. 
The choice to promote sustainable production is left to consumers, who 
can select “sustainable” – that is, certified – products. On the production 
side, it is the workers who are (mainly implicitly) made responsible for 
changes in the production process (cf. Gibbon and Riisgaard [2014] on a 
general trend towards a “responsibilisation” of the work on the farms). 
This responsibility of the workers is also implicit in the approach of 
Fairtrade, which we took as an example. Its standards are geared towards 
attaining a more “sustainable” production by strengthening the position 
of workers: “Fairtrade believes that people’s ability to implement sus-
tainable environmental and social practices depends on their incomes 
and standards of living.”24 
However, Fairtrade does not seem to profoundly change labour re-
lations, as was also concluded by Smith and Barrientos (2005: 196) and 
Hale and Opondo (2005: 317). Its main means to “empower” the work-
ers is the premium money. This premium gives employees a sense of 
ownership and assists them on crucial points – for example, in educating 
their children. But due to all the regulations set by Fairtrade itself with 
24  Fairtrade International, Fairtrade’s Contribution to a More Sustainable World, online: 
<www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/resources/2010-12-
31_flo-sustainability-position-paper.pdf> (8 October 2015). 
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regards to how the premium should be spent, whether the premium 
evens out unequal labour relations is questionable. Another example is 
that Fairtrade promotes self-development and education to enable work-
ers to leave the flower industry. Although such projects might help indi-
viduals, they do not change conditions in the industry itself. Eventually, 
it seems certification schemes in the Naivasha flower industry above all 
strengthen the position of the industry and capital, while claiming to 
solve the issue of “unsustainability.” 
Finally, regarding laws and state regulations, the effects of rising 
importance of certifications are twofold and even contradictory: On the 
one hand, many certifications require compliance with national and re-
gional regulations; therefore, they strengthen the enforcement of the 
existing institutional framework. On the other hand, farms primarily 
comply with industry-based, voluntary, non-state regulations. In another 
case, of tea plantations in Darjeeling (Besky 2014), farm managers even 
used the existence of certifications to argue in favour of the abolishment 
of more stringent national legislation. These industry-based regulations 
do not have the democratic, public nature of state legislations. 
Conclusion and Outlook 
This article showed how the emergence of a new value chain of direct 
sales, now coexisting with the traditional system of selling flowers 
through auctions, changed coordination mechanisms and governance 
structures in the global flower industry. A new demand for formal regu-
lations created certification schemes. These certifications are legitimised 
by claims that they make the industry more “sustainable,” yet they first 
and foremost give more control to big buyers: European retail chains. 
This appeal to “sustainability” fits into ongoing discussions and prac-
tices around Lake Naivasha, where before this shift to certifications farms 
and lobby groups were already engaged in “reputation management,” 
trying to denounce claims that their production practices are damaging the 
social-ecological system around the lake. For progressive farms around 
Naivasha, the step to becoming certified was thus not large, especially 
because standards of different certifications have overlapping require-
ments. And since the new markets in the direct sales value chain are not 
accessible without certifications, many farms decided to apply for them. 
As it is clear now that a wish to become certified is mainly caused 
by governance structures in the value chain and by the need to access 
markets, rather than by the wish to make production practices more sus-
tainable, one can ask what these certificates actually do within the farms 
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in Naivasha. The example of Fairtrade showed that it does not do what it 
explicitly aims to: change power relations in favour of the workers. In-
stead, these certifications bring in a new form of “governmentality” (cf. 
Dolan 2007). They have a depoliticising effect (cf. Swyngedouw 2014), as 
they effectively sideline discussions on labour conditions beyond what is 
included in the standards. 
It is perhaps not surprising that certifications that emerged from the 
governance structure in the value chain do not question that structure 
itself. In order to achieve a transformation of the industry, these certifi-
cations should be more explicit about what they mean by “sustainability” 
(be it environmental, social, or economic). In addition, compliance with 
the rules set by these certifications should not be dependent on farms 
wishing to enter markets but should be made mandatory and should thus 
be induced from outside the value chain. In short, “the political” should 
be brought back into the process. On that note, recent attempts of 
TransFair, the German member organisation of Fairtrade, to influence 
German and European political debates and economic and environmental 
policies seem to be timely and much called for (Fairtrade Deutschland 
2017). At the moment, rules for sustainability are mainly used as a tool to 
retain or gain control within the cut-flower industry rather than as a way 
of enhancing the possibility that “future generations” will still be able to 
use Lake Naivasha as a production site. 
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Nachhaltigkeit und Entpolitisierung: Zertifikate in der Schnitt-
blumenindustrie am Naivasha-See in Kenia 
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag thematisiert die Verbreitung von Zer-
tifizierungssystemen in der Schnittblumenindustrie von Naivasha, Kenia. 
Die Einführung von Zertifikaten wurde häufig damit legitimiert, dass sie 
zur Förderung der „Nachhaltigkeit“ beitragen. Die Autoren zeigen dem-
gegenüber, dass ihrer Einführung vor allem die wachsende Bedeutung der 
neuen Wertschöpfungskette „Direktverkauf“ zugrunde lag. Sie widmen 
sich vor allem „Fairtrade“, dem bekanntesten Zertifikat in Naivasha. Es 
zielt darauf ab, die Nachhaltigkeit der Produktion über eine Stärkung der 
Arbeiter zu fördern, impliziert jedoch keine grundlegende Änderung der 
Machtverhältnisse in der Industrie. Die Autoren kommen zu dem Schluss, 
dass „Nachhaltigkeit“ im Fall von Naivasha ein unklares Konzept darstellt, 
das im Wesentlichen dazu dient, die Einführung von Zertifizierungen zu 
legimitieren. Statt grundlegende Veränderungen im Produktionsprozess 
anzustoßen, verschleiern und verfestigen die Zertifikate die bestehenden 
sozio-ökonomischen Strukturen in der Industrie. Entsprechend kann die 
Einführung von Zertifizierungen „entpolitisierende“ Wirkung haben. 
Schlagwörter: Kenia, Internationaler Handel, Agroindustrie, Blumen, 
Arbeitsbeziehungen 
